A quick note before we begin

This episode was recorded in September 2025, and every price, space and programme mentioned in the original recording belonged to that version of my business. The six-month one-to-one offer discussed here later evolved into Momentum, and the £3,000 price in this story is not its current price.

I’ve removed the expired availability and promotion for Cashflow Confident. I have not rewritten the pricing decision to match what I sell now, because the useful part is seeing how I made the decision with the information, offer and audience I had then.

Listen to the episode

In this episode

I raised my six-month one-to-one price to £5,000, sat with it for a few weeks, then lowered it to £3,000.

Not because I panicked and decided the work was not valuable. Not because somebody complained. Not because lowering a price is automatically more ethical or accessible.

I lowered it because the price no longer matched the clients I most wanted to serve, the result I was best at delivering or the commercial model I wanted to build around the offer.

In this episode, we’re talking about:

• why pricing conversations are far too obsessed with increases;
• my full one-to-one pricing journey from £1,500 to £5,000 and back to £3,000;
• the wobble that made me discount spaces I did not need to discount;
• the three pricing inputs I had missed;
• how disposable income and perceived return affect a buying decision;
• why a lower headline price did not necessarily mean less business revenue;
• and how client lifetime value changed the maths.

We talk endlessly about raising prices

Charge more. Raise your rates. Add another zero. If the price makes you uncomfortable, it is probably right.

The online-business conversation tends to move in one direction, as though every price increase proves growth and every decrease reveals a confidence problem.

But pricing is not a personal-development leaderboard.

A higher price can improve capacity, margin and delivery. It can also move the offer away from the buyer you want, create a much higher burden of proof, distort the sales process or force the offer to promise a result it was never designed to deliver.

Sometimes raising the price is the strategic move. Sometimes lowering it is.

I lowered mine, and I think we should talk about it precisely because people rarely do.

My first coaching offer was £1,500 for three months

I began coaching in January 2024 after several years working in finance. My first one-to-one package was £1,500 for three months.

The offer sold. In fact, I became booked out for much of 2024 and at one point had 24 active one-to-one clients while working part-time hours.

Mad. Never doing that again.

The price made the offer comparatively easy to buy, but the delivery model had no respect for capacity. Twenty-four clients create a lot of calls, preparation, messages, emotional context and tiny tasks that do not appear when you divide the package price by three months.

Revenue existed. The model was not sustainable.

That is an important distinction, because an offer can sell well and still need redesigning. Sales prove somebody wants it at that price. They do not prove the business should continue delivering it in that way.

Then I tried tiered pricing

At one stage, I charged £1,500 to employed clients and £2,000 to self-employed clients.

My reasoning was that a business owner usually has more commercial upside from the work. Better pricing, cashflow and financial decisions could affect business revenue, and a legitimate business cost may receive different tax treatment from personal coaching, depending on the client’s circumstances and local rules.

But that was my pricing philosophy, not a universal rule that business owners should always be charged more. Two people can receive different forms of value from the same work, and their employment status alone does not settle what the offer should cost.

Eventually I returned to a blanket £1,500 and pre-sold spaces for the first quarter of 2025.

I discounted because I wobbled

I opened five spaces and sold around four at a discount.

Did I need to discount them? Probably not. I had the familiar moment of wondering whether people would buy, whether I had pushed too far and whether the price needed a helpful little nudge.

Even somebody who works with money beliefs can have a pricing wobble. Extremely inconvenient for the personal brand, but true.

The useful question is not whether fear ever appears. It is what you do with it.

Did demand actually change? Did qualified leads object to the price? Had the conversion rate dropped? Was the offer less profitable? Or did I feel uncomfortable and alter the commercial model before collecting evidence?

In this case, fear got a vote it had not earned.

The price moved to £3,000

I later increased the package to £3,000, double the original £1,500. Around that transition, one client joined at £2,000 and another at £3,000.

Then I redesigned the work from a three-month package into six months.

The longer structure made sense. Clients needed time to build the financial foundations, use the systems, identify the behaviour or beliefs interrupting them, practise making different decisions and begin looking towards longer-term wealth.

So I looked at the old maths and thought: if three months is £3,000, six months can be £5,000.

On paper, that was reasonable. The offer included more time, more support and a deeper process. At the beginning of September, I raised the price to £5,000.

Then I realised I had missed part of the pricing puzzle.

Price is not only a calculation of value

I had considered the length, depth and potential value of the work. I had not properly considered three connected things:

1. The financial stage and disposable income of the person I most wanted to serve.
2. The result I naturally emphasised and how I communicated its value.
3. The return a £5,000 buyer would reasonably expect to see and understand.

Those things changed the meaning of the same price.

You can believe an offer is worth £5,000 because the skills may help somebody for years. The buyer still needs to decide whether £5,000 is the best use of the money available now, compared with every other route to her goal.

Value does not exist only inside the offer. It exists in relation to the buyer, her alternatives, her urgency and what she believes the result will change.

I had priced away from the clients I wanted

The people I most wanted to work with were women and non-binary founders growing towards their first six figures, often making a few thousand pounds a month, sometimes reaching £5k or £10k months, but without reliable take-home pay or a financial system underneath the revenue.

They were not all established multi-six-figure business owners with £5,000 sitting unassigned for coaching.

At £5,000, particularly on a payment plan of more than £800 a month, the investment occupied a very different proportion of their available cash. The offer might still have been valuable, but affordability, risk and opportunity cost changed.

That created a catch-22. The client wanted support because the business did not yet pay her consistently, but the lack of reliable pay made the support difficult to buy.

This does not mean every offer must be affordable to every ideal client. That is impossible, and building a financially fragile service in the name of accessibility helps nobody. It means price is part of positioning. Change it, and you may change who the offer is realistically for.

My result was heart-led, while the price invited an ROI calculation

My coach reflected that I am deeply heart-led in the way I talk about the work. I care about what money changes in somebody’s life, the relief, choices, confidence and ability to build something beyond the next month.

Oh shit. Yeah. I had missed that bit, hadn’t I?

A £5,000 investment often triggers a more explicit return-on-investment calculation. How much additional revenue will this produce? How quickly? What measurable financial result can I expect?

The work could absolutely affect revenue, savings, debt and long-term financial decisions. But I was not positioning it primarily as a direct business-growth offer with a clean commercial return. I was selling a broader transformation while asking the buyer to make a high-ticket, numbers-led decision.

The delivery and the value were not necessarily wrong. The value communication and price expectation were drifting apart.

So I lowered the price to £3,000

The six-month offer moved from £5,000 to £3,000, with a payment plan of six payments of £500.

And at that point, I thought £3,000 was a fucking steal.

Lowering the price did not mean I had decided six months of work was worth less than three. It meant I had redesigned the business around the buyer and the wider client journey rather than treating this one package as the only place revenue could be made.

That distinction matters.

If you reduce a price without changing anything else, yes, each sale creates less revenue. If the old offer was £5,000 and the new one is £3,000, the immediate difference is £2,000 per client.

But immediate contract value is not the whole commercial model.

Client lifetime value changed the maths

I did not want clients to need the same one-to-one support forever. Like a good personal trainer, the goal was to help them develop the skills and systems to continue without permanent dependence.

But finishing one stage could lead naturally to another.

After building cashflow systems, paying themselves consistently and resolving immediate financial pressure, a client might be ready for longer-term wealth work. At the time, I was developing that next step as an offer called Wealthy AF.

So the business could acquire the right client through a £3,000 offer, serve her well, then offer an appropriate next stage later. The total client lifetime value could exceed the original £5,000 package while the first decision remained more accessible to the audience I wanted.

For example, if a client invested £3,000 initially and later chose a £2,000 next-stage offer, her lifetime value would be £5,000. If she stayed for further relevant support, it could become higher.

That is not permission to slice one required result into endless upsells. Each offer needs to deliver the outcome it promises. The next step should solve a genuinely different problem that becomes relevant after the first one.

The pricing decision worked because the client journey changed with it.

Monthly recurring revenue mattered too

At £5,000 over six months, the payment was roughly £833 a month. At £3,000 over six months, it became £500.

The lower monthly payment could improve conversion among the intended buyers, and more suitable clients paying £500 could create steadier monthly recurring revenue than fewer people hesitating over £833.

That does not happen automatically. A lower price needs enough demand and enough delivery capacity to compensate. If it requires returning to 24 active clients, we have recreated the original problem wearing a new price tag.

So the full model needs checking:

• How many active clients fit the delivery capacity?
• What monthly revenue does that create?
• What does fulfilment cost?
• How many new sales are needed as clients finish?
• What percentage continue into a relevant next offer?
• Does the resulting profit fund owner’s pay and overflow?

Being human and being a business are not opposing identities. You can care about the person buying and still calculate whether the model works.

A lower price is not automatically more aligned

There are bad reasons to lower a price.

You may react to one objection, compare yourself with a cheaper competitor, feel guilty about earning, or use a discount to avoid improving the sales conversation. Lowering the price can make an offer less sustainable and attract buyers who are not more suitable, only more numerous.

There are also strategic reasons:

• the current price moved the offer into a market you do not want to serve;
• the buyer’s available cash and perceived return do not support it;
• the offer is an entry point into a longer, coherent client journey;
• a different delivery model reduces cost without reducing the promised result;
• conversion data shows a meaningful price barrier among qualified leads;
• or the business can create more profit through a lower price and better capacity utilisation.

The direction of the price tells you nothing on its own. You need the mechanism.

The better pricing questions

Instead of asking whether you should raise or lower your prices, ask:

1. Who is this offer for, financially and commercially?
2. What urgent result are they buying?
3. How do they measure that result?
4. What alternatives are they comparing it with?
5. What cashflow does the payment structure create?
6. How many clients can you serve without compromising delivery or your life?
7. What profit remains at that capacity?
8. Where does the offer sit in the wider client journey?
9. What evidence do you have that price is the issue?

That final question will save you from a lot of unnecessary fiddling.

If leads are not seeing the offer, changing the price does not fix visibility. If they do not understand the result, a discount does not fix positioning. If they want it but cash timing is the barrier, payment terms may matter more than headline price. If the offer sells but delivery consumes the business, the model needs changing even if nobody objects to the cost.

Pricing is one lever. Diagnose before you pull it.

What I would carry forward now

The specific £3,000 decision belonged to that offer, audience and stage of my business. It is not a permanent statement that £3,000 is the correct price for six months of one-to-one support.

My positioning, methods, results and the commercial problem I solve have developed since then. Today, Momentum combines revenue strategy, offer design, sales systems and cashflow to help established service providers build consistent income and reliable take-home pay.

That evolution changes how the result is understood and how a buyer evaluates return.

But the rule I would keep is this: a price has to work for the client, the offer and the business at the same time.

If it only works when you ignore the buyer’s cashflow, it is not well positioned. If it only works when you ignore your delivery capacity, it is not profitable. If it only works when you ignore the value of the result, it will be difficult to sell with conviction.

The best price is not the highest number you can persuade somebody to pay. It is the number that supports the right buying decision and a business model you can continue.

Fund the damn life

The podcast was called Fund the Damn Life because that was the point of all of this. I was unapologetically in business to make money, but revenue only became useful when it funded the life outside the business.

Pricing sits in the middle of that chain.

Price affects how many clients you need. Client volume affects capacity. Capacity affects the hours and energy left for your life. Margin affects what the business can pay you. Owner’s pay affects what that life can contain.

So no, pricing is not a confidence exercise performed in isolation. It is business design.

That’s my rant. Ba-bing, ba-boom.

Continue listening

Episodes 11 and 12 were launch-period bonus content rather than part of the core numbered article series, so the written series continues with Episode 13.

How to Make More Money Without Launching a New Offer

Want to know whether the price is really the problem?

A price can look too high when the positioning is weak, too low when the delivery is bloated and perfectly reasonable while the payment timing quietly wrecks your cashflow.

Inside Momentum, we look at the complete model, who the offer is for, what it needs to produce, how many clients fit your capacity, what the sales data says and how much money reaches you after delivery.

Apply for Momentum, and we’ll build pricing into the revenue strategy instead of changing it on vibes.